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Antitrust and World Trade:
Tempest in an Interna-
tional Teapot?
DONALD I. BAKER*
For several years, we have heard a great deal of shouting-and quite a
lot of lawyering-about the impact of American antitrust law on interna-
tional trade and investment. Unfortunately, we have not seen much
quiet thinking on the relevance of antitrust to our broader goals as a
nation of both consumers and producers.
Various American business groups have complained loudly that
antitrust hampers their efforts to compete in an increasingly competi-
tive world.' Foreign businessmen have sometimes complained that
American antitrust merger enforcement discriminates against them
and hampers foreign investment in the United States. Both groups
repeatedly stress that we in the United States apply legal rules which
foreign governments do not apply to enterprises. American business
asks for broad antitrust exemptions to make it "more competitive" with
firms abroad (and foreign firms sometimes seem to be asking for
"diplomatic immunity" for various U.S. activities).
Both arguments rest on some doubtful factual assumptions. Both
seem to assume a "least common denominator" approach to law en-
forcement. If the criticism that "the United States is tougher" amounts
to no more than saying "the United States protects its consumers better
than other governments," then most would say "so be it."
I believe that the business criticism of the antitrust laws in the
international field involves serious errors, both of fact and of law.
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice;
and Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Spring 1974). The views stated do
not necessarily represent those of the Department of Justice.
1. See generally Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism
of the Senate Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-83 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Export Expansion Hearings].
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American businessmen, when pressed, have generally been unable to
come up with hard factual instances where American antitrust law has
prevented them from doing things that were constructive and worth-
while for our overall international interest. Moreover, the critics have
failed to perceive the primary thrust of our antitrust law-to protect
the interests of Americans as consumers-and they have failed to see
the broad flexibility written into the antitrust statutes. Beyond this, they
fail to perceive the broad interest of the, United States, as an exporting
nation, in having a vigorous and competitive domestic economy-a
message which has not been lost on a number of important industrial
nations abroad.
2
I believe that we can compete abroad and also protect the consumer
at home. But we must be willing to think hard about both our goals and
our legal tools if we are to succeed.
I
TRADING IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
When the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, the United States was
still a largely agrarian nation and most of its exports were primary
products. Sixty years later, after World War II, we were the great
industrial power of the western world-a leading exporter of capital,
high technology products, and still a major exporter of many primary
agricultural products. Most other leading industrial countries had been
badly damaged in the war and the United States stood far ahead of the
pack. In time, things had changed again. By 1970, other leading
industrial countries-including particularly Japan and West
Germany-had fully recovered, and thus had applied themselves with
great energy to developing new business methods and new products; as
a result, the United States no longer enjoyed an overwhelmingly
dominant economic advantage over the western world. Indeed, the
United States was running large balance of payments deficits and was
encountering increasing difficulty in competing in many world markets
with its industrial products. This was due, in part, to unfavorable
currency exchange rates; in part, to foreign barriers to various of our
products; and in part, to the price and quality of our products.
2. See, e.g., W. F UGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANITRusT LAWS ch. 16 (2d ed.
1973); Holoran, Tokyo Aide Startles Business by Enforcing Antitrust Laws, N.Y. Times, June
13, 1974, at 69, col. 1.
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In his perceptive 1971 report to the President entitled The United
States and the Changing World Economy,3 Peter Peterson examined this
situation and stressed that we were going to have to compete in the
world on our merits. Peterson looked at many things-the new compe-
tition brought into our own markets by European and East Asian
industrial firms, as well as our difficulties in competing abroad-and he
asked us to look at our future. In essence, he said we have two choices.
One is the road to mercantilism-to "erecting a variety of new restric-
tions ... against the products of our trade partners." He rejected this
choice as "a prescription for defeat and an admission of failure."
Instead, he recommended the second alternative, looking in the oppo-
site direction:
"[11o meet head-on the essential-if demanding-task of improving our pro-
ductivity and our competitiveness in an increasingly competitive wornd, to seize
the initiative in designing a new, comprehensive program designed to build on
America's strengths, and to encourage a competitive world trading system with
the confidence that comes with having a sense of our future.... IThe basis for
this confidence must be a strong domestic economy, .. . stimulated by ... the
technological advances which will both increase our international competitive-
ness and help our society fulfill its promise of a better life and productive work
for its citizens."1
4
As Peterson makes clear, strong competition at home is vital to our
mission. A firm which has trouble competing in Columbus or Cleveland
will have an even harder time in Munich or Milan. Competition is
particularly vital to the high-technology products which have been
America's strongest suit. To invent and develop a new product requires
skill, imagination, capital and hard work. These are qualities people do
not develop unless promised the rewards of success or threatened with
the penalties of failure. An unchallenged dominant firm (or group of
firms) can go on practicing the art of the past, while export oppor-
tunities are missed and consumer demands go unmet. The situation is
only exacerbated, both for the consumer, and for the country, if the
dominant firm or group is protected at home by the government
against more enterprising foreign competitors.
The automobile industry offers one highly topical example of dom-
inant firms missing important opportunities. For years, Detroit re-
'sisted the small car because the industry leaders felt that "mini-cars
mean mini-profits." The small car market-then small-was left to the
Europeans, and later the Japanese. They found at first a few, and
3. P. PETERSON, THE UNITED STATES IN THE CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (2 vols.
1971).
4. 1 P. PETERSON, id. at iv.
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gradually many more Americans who preferred small cars to the large
gas-guzzling cars so favored by Detroit. And in time, Detroit could no
longer resist the tide; it too has had to develop small cars and advertise
their gas mileage, rather than their horsepower. Of course, we may still
have too many large gas-guzzling cars on the road to serve our national
need in a time of energy shortage, but think how much worse it would
be today if we had nothing but giants on the road! And this might well
have been the case, but for the important role played by foreign
competition in the domestic market. (One might add that the large
Detroit cars have never done very well in foreign markets, where
people have had generally poorer roads, shorter distances and much
higher fuel costs.)
Steel is another case where the dominant American firms have been
slow to innovate and are now hard-pressed in the world market. Our
American firms did not develop or promptly deploy the basic oxygen
process. Rather, it was developed abroad and first introduced into this
country by a small manufacturer. Of course, in the end, the dominant
American steel-makers had to come around to the new process, despite
their heavy fixed investments in the old technology-but they did so
only reluctantly, only under pressure. Meanwhile, they screamed, in-
creasingly loudly, for government protection against imports; and
ultimately they received such protection in the form of voluntary steel
quotas, negotiated with government assistance. This in turn led-not
too surprisingly-to domestic price increases, which Professor Adams
has described as "electrifying." Within three years, steel industry prices
rose to almost ten times their prior rates; and some key products, such
as cold rolled sheet, rose over 30 percent.' These increases were passed
on, not only to the American consumer, but to American firms seeking
to sell finished steel products abroad.
What is disturbing is not only the increases in prices paid by Ameri-
can customers, but the implications of protection for the firms pro-
tected. It seems highly unlikely that a firm, artificially protected at
home this year, will prove better able to compete abroad next year.
With a few exceptions, the general rule seems to be that those who live
off protection need ever more; and those who must buy from -a
protected industry need ever more outside competition.
5. W. Adams, Competitive Measures and Competitive Facts As They Affect Economic Standards
in CONFERENCE BOARD, ANTITRUST PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL PRIoRiTiEs 5-6 (Transcript
of Eleventh Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy, Mar. 2, 1972).
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II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
For almost a century, antitrust laws have provided our principal legal
tool for enforcing competition. These laws have worked successfully
because they have both breadth and flexibility-two elements of great
importance in international trade problems. In general, these laws seek
to deal with restraints imposed by competitors, restraints involving
customers and suppliers, mergers and acquisitions, and the abuse of
monopoly power.
The statutes which are most relevant here are section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits anticompetitive trade restraints, and
section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits anticompetitive acquisi-
tions of corporate stock and assets.7 Section 1, which was enacted in
1890, declares illegal "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy in
restraint of" interstate or foreign commerce. Since the Supreme
Court's 1911 Standard Oil decision,8 the "every contract" language in
section 1 has been subjected to the so-called "rule of reason," under
which the courts analyze the conduct involved to determine whether it
is unreasonable on a comparison of its legitimate purpose with its effect
as a restraint on free competition. However, the Supreme Court has
concluded over the years that certain types of conduct are so generally
unreasonable that they should be regarded as illegal per se. The per se
category generally covers price fixing agreements, agreements among
competitors dividing geographic markets or classes of customers, tying
agreements, concerted refusals to deal, and certain kinds of reciprocity
agreements. The Supreme Court has explained per se liability in these
terms:
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use.9
For reasons explained below, I believe that many types of conduct
which are treated as per se in terms of domestic commerce can and
- should be fully analyzed under the "rule of reason" when applied in
the international context.
6. Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
7. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
8. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
9. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
(Vol. 8: 16
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914 and amended in 1950,
prohibits any corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring stock
or assets from another corporation "... . where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'
0
Section 7 is quite different from section 1 in that it does not require the
government to prove an actual lessening of competition, but only that
the transaction's effect "may be substantially" to lessen competition in
the future. Moreover, since section 7 only applies to acquisitions whose
effect is "in any section of the country," it reaches only domestic
mergers, and overseas mergers which have some impact on our domes-
tic markets.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is a legal provision of especially great
breadth and flexibility. It was recently described by the Supreme Court
as "the Magna Carta of free enterprise."" Thirty years earlier Chief
Justice Hughes had said:
The purpose of the Sherman Anti-trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of
interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest,
to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic
endeavor. As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not
go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate enter-
prise or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for
escape. The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial. Its
general phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essen-
tial standard of reasonableness.'
2
As already noted, the Supreme Court has qualified this general state-
ment in subsequent cases imposing certain types of per se liability, on
the theory that the restraints at issue are so commonly unreasonable
that it is not worth holding long and complex trials over them. In the
main, these decisions have not involved foreign trade, where flexibility
is still present. The statute still can be construed by the courts and by
the enforcement agencies to achieve rational policies in the real world
of international trade.
Much of the present confusion arises from the fact that antitrust
lawyers have spent too much time parsing footnotes and not enough
time thinking about where our national interests lie. Thus, they worry
about whether some particular rule of antitrust law, generally applied
in the domestic economy, would have some perverse effect in the
10. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
11. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
12. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
1974]
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international realm, and they do this over and over again. The situa-
tion must be examined in a wider context.
The broad goal of antitrust law is to protect the American consuming
public by providing a spur to business efficiency, innovation and
cost-based pricing. In the words of the Supreme Court,
[T]he Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions.'3
A second goal of antitrust is to protect individual firms from "bully-
.boy" tactics by their more powerful competitors. Such tactics may not
have an immediate and measurable effect on the aggregate market, but
the Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not necessary. A
coercive restraint
... is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose
business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.
Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one
at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups.
1 4
What then is the antitrust interest with respect to international trade?
First-and foremost-it is to insure that the American consumer re-
ceives the benefit of import competition. This is particularly vital where
our domestic industry is dominated by a very few firms or otherwise is
not itself particularly competitive. The second major U.S. interest is to
protect the export opportunities of U.S. firms-primarily to protect
them against "bully-boy" tactics by other enterprises subject to our
jurisdiction. We have also had a third and relatively minor interest: to
protect the American taxpayer from anticompetitive restraints which
increase the cost of overseas procurement of either goods or services
financed by the U.S. government (and very often limited by our law to
U.S. sources of supply).
As a practical matter, the main antitrust concern has been with the
classic international cartel. This is an arrangement by which leading
firms in different countries get together and agree not to compete in
each other's "home" markets. Where American firms are involved, such
a cartel has a direct and immediate impact on both our markets at
13. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 4.
14. Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
[Vol. 8: 16
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home and our firms' export opportunities abroad. It may serve the
"private" interests of the parties, but it certainly does not serve the
"public" interests of the United States as a trading and consuming
nation. Historically, the most important antitrust decisions in the entire
international field involve cases of this "classic" cartel type of restraint.
These are discussed in the succeeding sections on import competition
and competitive export opportunities.
III
PROTECTING COMPETITIVE MARKETS AT HOME
Foreign competition has proven particularly important to American
buyers in two situations. The first is where most or all of the goods
originate abroad. The second occurs where we have a sluggish domes-
tic industry, which very much needs the spur of outside competition.
The latter situation has been particularly apparent in a number of our
large oligopolies; as a result, we have seen such products as small cars
and stainless steel razor blades become available in this country largely
because of the pressure of foreign firms selling here. It is an important
goal of antitrust policy to preserve this kind of foreign competition as a
factor in the American market.
Antitrust law has been used in a number of different ways to
preserve the competition of imports (and foreign firms) in our domes-
tic market. First, and most important, have been the Sherman Act
section 1 cases directed at what I have called the classic cartel-a
worldwide territorial allocation scheme by leading firms in different
countries. National Lead15 and Timken16 are the leading decisions in this
field. Both involved different American and foreign producers who
divided up the world into exclusive territories, and thereby barred
foreign competitors from coming into the United States. Sometimes
this has been largely accomplished by technology agreements which
effectively divided territories into exclusive "home" markets, as in the
ICI-DuPont case.17 These decisions, in effect, treated such territorial
allocations as per se illegal: ". . . the law is crystal clear: a conspiracy to
15. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modified, 332
U.S. 319 (1947).
16. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
modif ied, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
17. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
1974]
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divide territories, which affects American commerce, violates the
Sherman Act.""'
The pending Westinghouse-Mitsubishi case' 9 is probably the most im-
portant current case in this classic cartel area. The Government is
challenging very long-term agreements between leading American and
Japanese electrical equipment manufacturers covering both patents
and know-how. Each firm is licensed to the technology of the other,
and each is prevented by the agreement from selling products under
the licensed technology in the "home" market of the other. The broad
result has been to keep these two large electrical equipment manufac-
turers out of each other's "home" markets-an important consideration
for the United States given the highly concentrated nature of its
domestic market and its anticompetitive history.20
A second, and perhaps less familiar, kind 6f cartel involves a
worldwide price fix-usually on products which come mainly from
foreign sources, and may even have no reasonable domestic substitutes.
Any such scheme is bound to have a serious impact on our domestic
market where import competition is significant. The best recent exam-
ple is the international quinine cartel which was prosecuted by the
Department of Justice in 196821 (and by the European Economic
Community a few years later). This cartel involved foreign firms and
some foreign subsidiaries of American firms, which were engaged in a
long-term and broadly successful effort to control the world prices on
quinine, by straight price fixing agreements and by collusive bidding to
keep United States Government stockpile disposals from disrupting the
high price. The Government brought criminal and civil suits against
the foreign firms, the American firms with subsidiaries involved, and
the United States quinine importers. It was able to secure personal
jurisdiction over enough of them to put a stop to the cartel and bring
down the price of quinine, a product area in which the United States
consumed about a third of the world's supply.
The foregoing types of cartel restraints have been and should be
subjected to per se rules. They are clearly harmful to domestic con-
sumers, just as are purely domestic price fixes and territorial allocation
18. Id at 592. See also United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. at 523.
19. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civ. No. C-70-852-SAW (April 22,
1970).
20. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,699 (E*D. Pa.
1960) (rejection of nolo contendere pleas).
21. United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 1970
Trade Cas. 73,181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree).
[Vol. 8: 16
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schemes. The whole rationale of per se liability, as discussed above, is
that the particular restraints are so generally harmful that no purpose
is served by conducting a detailed factual inquiry in every case. Classic
international cartels among private firms fully meet this test: they
directly affect U.S. consumer interests and have no redeeming public
values at all. In general, where such a cartel is involved, the Govern-
ment will proceed against both the American firm and the foreign
party where it is able to obtain personal jurisdiction (as has generally
been possible in the leading cases).
The domestic market may also be affected where a group of Ameri-
can firms cooperate in a joint purchasing program. The issue is
particularly lively in a market dominated by foreign sellers (often
including foreign governments). It thus presents an issue analogous to
that which occurs when employers combine to negotiate (and perhaps
shut down their facilities) in a labor negotiation where the other side
(labor) is exempt from the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice
has recognized that such joint purchasing arrangements may be ac-
ceptable, where they are likely to result in lower prices for imports and
adequate safeguards insure that the joint efforts do not spill over into
domestic pricing, marketing and business operations. The most impor-
tant example is, of course, the Government's granting business review
clearance in 1971 for leading American oil companies to engage in
joint negotiation with the OPEC governments over the production of
crude oil in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The Depart-
ment felt that the joint bargaining and sharing arrangements offered
safeguards against individual firms-particularly smaller ones-being
eliminated one at a time:
[I]t was then believed that these actions were necessary as a countervailing force
to the producer government cartel with which the oil companies were con-
fronted, and that these actions would more likely have a beneficial than an
.adverse effect on U.S. foreign commerce. It is important to recall that the stated
intent of these proposed arrangements was to maintain oil prices at lower levels
than would exist if the OPEC nations could negotiate with the companies
one-by-one .... 22
Recognizing that such joint purchasing arrangements involve serious
competitive risks, the Government at all times insisted on careful
surveillance of the joint operations and on avoidance of spillover
22. Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper, Hearings on the
International Oil Crisis and the Antitrust Laws before the Subcomm. on Multinational
Corporations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (June 5,
1974).
19741
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effects in the domestic market. When conditions had changed, the
Department indicated in 1974 that the original letters were no longer
applicable.
23
Mergers involving foreign firms may also affect the American mar-
ket. As noted above, the "section of the country" language in Clayton
Act section 7 gives merger enforcement an obvious domestic focus,
although it would possibly have this focus even absent such specific
statutory language.
Thus, the Department of Justice has challenged a merger between
two foreign corporations which would have the necessary effect of
merging their two American subsidiaries, in circumstances where those
American subsidiaries were important direct competitors in the same
market. 24 The result of the case was to force divestiture of one of the
American subsidiaries so that pre-existing competition continued in the
American market. This is a fairly unusual factual situation, but it is a
straightforward application of our normal prohibitions-which are
very strict-against mergers of direct competitors in the same market.
The same prohibition would apply where a foreign company, already
operating a subsidiary in the United States, sought to acquire an
American firm which was a direct competitor of that subsidiary.
Section 7 will also reach a merger between a leading American firm
and a foreign firm, not operating in the United States, which is a
leading potential entrant into the market of the American firm. Domes-
tic decisions recognize that a potential entrant, while standing at the
edge of the market, may have an important effect on the performance
of an oligopolistic industry. 25 This is equally true whether the potential
entrant is a domestic or foreign firm and, indeed, in certain industries
where entry barriers are particularly high (e.g., automobiles), the only
important potential entrants may be from outside the United States.
Imagine-recalling my earlier discussion on automobiles-how differ-
ent our domestic situation might have been had General Motors in the
early 1950's bought up Volkswagen, Fiat and Renault! Such potential
competition is lost when the leading foreign firm and the leading
domestic firm are allowed to merge.
The potential competition theory has been applied to at least two
23. Id. at 14.
24. United States v. Ciba Corporation, 1970 Trade Gas. 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(consent decree).
25. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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cases involving foreign firms. One is the pending Gillette-Braun case,26
which challenges the acquisition by a dominant American razor man-
ufacturer of a leading European electric razor manufacturer which had
not yet entered the United States market. Another challenged the
British Petroleum-Sohio merger-which involved a leading interna-
tional oil company, with major U.S. resources, buying the dominant
firm in the Ohio market.2 7 BP did not then compete in Ohio, but was
engaged in marketing on the East Coast. Both Gillette and BP involved
application of a potential competition doctrine which has been widely
applied against American firms.
Thus, broadly speaking, the main thrust of American antitrust law
and enforcement has been to preserve and promote competition in the
domestic American market. This has been accomplished by applying
American law to restrictive practices of both foreign and American
firms affecting this market, regardless of where the restrictions were
entered into; and it has been accomplished by applying merger law to
insure that both actual and potential competition are preserved in the
American market. Other aspects of American law enforcement are
considered in the next section.
IV
COMPETITIVE EXPORTS ABROAD
The second part of the international antitrust enforcement mission is
to protect American exports of goods, services and capital against
privately-imposed restraints barring them from foreign markets. In
other words, we want our goods to be able to compete abroad on their
merits. Cartels can prevent this.
American firms are normally permitted to collaborate in selling
abroad, so long as they avoid anticompetitive spillovers into the domes-
tic market. Thus, in general, they can collectively agree on prices and
markets, since the Sherman Act does not extend to the protection of
foreign buyers against such horizontal restraints (a matter primarily for
foreign law).
The Webb-Pomerene Act specifically authorizes such arrangements,
26. United States v. Gillette Co., Civ. No. 68-141 (D.C. Mass. 1968); see 1 TRADE REG.
REP. 4,345.19.
27. United States v. The Standard Oil Co., 1970 Trade Cas. 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(consent decree).
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where "goods, wares and merchandise" are involved and where certain
safeguards are met.2 8 In fact, Webb-Pomerene has proven to be of little
practical importance because most joint export arrangements may be
carried on under the Sherman Act, and because American firms selling
highly differentiated products have generally not wanted to merge
sales efforts with their competitors. To eliminate any doubt, however,
the Administration has in 1974 proposed to expand Webb-Pomerene
to cover various types of services.
29
There are, of course, several kinds of situations in which private
arrangements may foreclose export and investment opportunities for
American firms abroad, and may therefore be subject to our antitrust
laws. One is the classic cartel, already discussed, whereby the American
firm agrees to limit its own exports into a foreign competitor's market
as part of an international market allocation scheme.
30
Another is where a joint venture is formed among the leading firms
in an industry to promote exports to a foreign country or countries.
Such a joint venture may not exclude the remaining American firms,
where this would deprive them of the benefit of making export sales.
This is but a particular application of the standard antitrust principle
that, where different firms in an industry jointly control an essential
facility, they must grant equal access to this facility to all competitors in
the trade; this principle has been applied to enterprises as diverse as a
terminal railway, a fish market, the Associated Press and the New York
Stock Exchange. 3 ' It seems fully applicable to joint arrangements
designed to promote or sell American goods or services abroad.
Yet another situation in which market opportunities abroad may be
unlawfully foreclosed would be where American firms conspire to drive
another American firm out of an export market. A leading example
involved predatory pricing by a group of American steamship lines for
the purpose of driving an independent line off a route reserved for
American-flag carriers (i.e., an export market for U.S. services). 32 A
variant would be where an American firm, enjoying monopoly power
28. Webb-Pomerene Act § 40, 40 Stat. 516-18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
29. S. 1774, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., tit. 11 (1973). See also testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Thomas E. Kauper, September 6, 1973 on this bill and on S. 1483.
30. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
31. United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 F. 732 (D. Mass. 1919); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963).
32. See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
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in a foreign market, exercised it to exclude other American imports
from that market. The Continental Ore case, discussed below, is a
leading example.33
Exclusive dealing arrangements can also create problems by exclud-
ing other American firms from export opportunities. For example, if a
leading U.S. firm enters into an exclusive, long-term contract with a
leading foreign customer, this contract would have the necessary effect
of preventing any other American firms from competing for that
customer's business. Such a contract would have to be scrutinized in
terms of its competitive effect, particularly with regard to the foreign
buyer's importance in the total market for U.S. exports.3 4 A tie-in may
have a similar effect. Thus, a patent license which requires procure-
ment of goods from the U.S. licensor may run afoul of U.S. law,
although an arrangement which simply ties the procurement to any
U.S. supplier might be permissible, since such an arrangement involves
no restraint on U.S. foreign commerce.
A final example illustrating the way in which foreign market oppor-
tunities can be foreclosed is the foreign buying cartel. If a group of
foreign firms combine to allocate their purchasing among various
American sources, they are necessarily limiting competition within our
domestic economy for goods which will be exported. Such buying
cartels are of direct interest to our government, and should be subject
to American antitrust scrutiny to the extent that we can assert jurisdic-
tion over the parties.
What is equally important is the broad range of export arrangements
which are not covered by U.S. antitrust laws because they involve no
unreasonable restraint of U.S. foreign commerce. The Department of
Justice discussed this issue during the 1972 Congressional hearings on
an "export promotion" bill giving the Secretary of Commerce broad
authority to grant antitrust exemptions for the promotion of exports.
The Department (which was obviously concerned by the open-ended
authority) pressed the bill's proponents, inside government and out, to
provide some real examples of where antitrust was limiting exports. A
rather short list was then produced, which the Department analyzed in
its testimony.
3 5
33, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
34. Cf. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
35. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Walker B. Comegys, Export
Expansion Hearings, supra note 1, at 807-16 (1972); see also 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
50,129 (1972).
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Among other things, the Department dealt with a series of examples
of territorial restrictions outside the United States. It concluded that such
restrictions, whether vertically or horizontally imposed, were generally
unobjectionalhle from the standpoint of U.S. antitrust law (even if
highly objectionable under Common Market or foreign antitrust law).
Some of the examples involved territorial schemes based on patent and
know-how licenses. The Department indicated that a patent is territor-
ial by nature and that know-how restrictions are reasonable, if limited
in time and scope and truly related to valuable know-how. Tie-ins on
foreign licensing arangements were said by the Department probably
to be reasonable so long as they did not foreclose competing American
sellers (as opposed to foreign sellers) of the tied products. Several other
examples concerned various types of joint venture arrangements, in-
cluding joint construction contracts, joint bidding on foreign jobs, and
joint manufacturing. The Department indicated:
In general, joint ventures abroad by American companies in cooperation with
foreign companies present no antitrust problems unless (1) participation in the
joint venture is a prereqiisite to competition and some American firms are
arbitrarily excluded ... or (2) the activities of the joint venturers has [sic) some
substantial impact on the domestic commerce of the United States, in which case
the venture will be judged by rules applying domestically. Joint ventures have
been held illegal in a number of international cartel cases . .. but the joint
venturers there went down as part of larger illegal schemes and involved
dominant enterprises.38
The law indeed affords American firms considerable discretion in
the structuring and conduct of their export operations. Moreover,
explicit protection is provided by the Webb-Pomerene Act for certain
joint-sale arrangements involving goods, wares, and merchandise.37
The main utility of this statute has been in its application to sales
abroad of primary products where United States exporters have enjoyed
some monopoly power. Here American firms found it worthwhile to
create a genuine export cartel. Webb-Pomerene has not proven par-
ticularly useful as a joint-selling tool for highly technical or differen-
tiated products-the most important of our national exports-since
each American firm has wished to push its own distinct product rather
than to undertake a joint effort for the benefit of all.
Even under the Sherman Act, American exporters of goods and
services enjoy wide latitude in how they structure their arrangements
and carry on their business. Of course, the Sherman Act may be
36. Export Expansion Hearings, supra note 1, at 815.
37. Webb-Pomerene Act § 40, 40 Stat. 516-18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
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applied to foreign arrangements which impose substantial limitations
on re-export back into the United States of the goods exported abroad,
or which prevent foreign firms (e.g., joint venture partners) from
themselves exporting into the United States market. Generally, such
restraints would be examined under the rule of reason. The question
here concerns the spillover effect into the American market and, where
such effect is significant, the restriction should be struck down. Where
it is not significant, it may qualify if an ancillary restraint to a legitimate
venture. To give broader antitrust protection would be to make the
American consumer subsidize exports of our firms by paying noncom-
petitive, or less competitive, prices here in the United States.
There is one other relatively minor caveat to the general liberality of
American antitrust law with respect to exports. That concerns exports
financed by the United States. Government and reserved to American
suppliers. Thus, in the 1968 Concentrated Phosphate case,38 the Supreme
Court held that a Webb-Pomerene export cartel could not be used in a
foreign fertilizers sale to Korea financed under the American A.I.D.
program. The Court noted that the main Congressional motive behind
the Act was to "... . increase American exports by depriving foreigners
of the benefits of competition among American firms, without in any
significant way injuring American consumers. .... -39 In this case, the
Court stressed that the particular market (i.e., A.I.D.-financed fer-
tilizer) was reserved to American suppliers by law and that, therefore,
particular transactions did not come within the scope of the statute.
"The major impact of allowing the combination appellees desire would
not be to encourage American exports; it would be to place the burden
of noncompetitive pricing on the shoulders of the American taxpayer.
"40
Somewhat related is Pacfic Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.,
decided by the D.C. Circuit earlier the same year.41 This case involved
a conspiracy among the members of a conference of American-flag
lines to drive the non-conference plaintiff line off the route for
transportation of fertilizer from Viet Nam to Korea. The cargoes were
financed by A.I.D. and the business was reserved by law to U.S.-flag
carriers. However, since only services were involved there was not even
an arguable Webb-Pomerene exemption. The Court of Appeals re-
38. United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 209.
41. 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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jected defendant's contention that the commerce in question was not in
the reach of the Sherman Act. The court found that carriers "in
participating in the market of supplying the service of transportation in
United States-flag vessels, were engaged in foreign commerce of the
United States.142 In essence, the court found the parties were engaged
in the export of U.S. services.
[S]ince there is an identifiable, distinctive market for American-flag shipping
service where the American characteristic is dominant-a market defined as
involving the transportation of A.I.D.-financed cargoes, which has a definite
nexus with significant interests of the United States-the Sherman Act is
applicable to a conspiracy to exclude newcomers from the trade.43
Earlier the court had indicated:
It may be assumed that, as a matter of construing Congressional intent, the
Sherman Act has no application where the market involved consists of shipping
services between two foreign ports, without any American characteristic, andthe
only American aspect is that one or some of the persons competing in the
transportation market is offering American-flag ships .... 44
I find Concentrated Phospate and Pacific Seafarers to be rather
narrow-and wise-exceptions to the general rule. Where the U.S.
Government is financing the transactions involved and reserving the
business to U.S. firms, we have no national interest in having American
firms restrain commerce in that area.
Finally, in the export- area, there may be some special problems
posed by the activities of foreign governments. This subject is discussed
in a succeeding section. Suffice it to say, however, that where a foreign
government requires an American firm to do something that would




This twofold approach-emphasizing domestic compensation and
competitive export opportunities-has been criticized from both sides.
Some feel that it leaves a wider role for antitrust than is "realistic" in
the modern world. Others think it assumes too narrow an antitrust
role.
The first group would generally like to roll back antitrust, even at the
42. Id. at 811.
43. Id. at 816.
44. Id.
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price of significant spillover effects in the domestic market. This
approach is typified by a speech which former Treasury Secretary
Connally gave before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar As-
sociation in April 1973. He treated antitrust as an historical relic, left
over from the quiet horse-and-buggy days of the 1890's. "The world in
[sic] changing, and we must change with it." These changes, he argued,
dictate "substantial amendment" to our antitrust laws today.45 He saw
American firms as being inhibited by a too vigorous application of what
he regarded as outdated laws. Mr.- Connally did not propose any
precise reforms, but he clearly seemed to favor broad authority for
American firms to enter into agreements which would in any way
promote exports, and he opposed any antitrust monopoly or merger
cases which might limit exports in any way.
Others have been less rhetorical, but have still generally favored
broad antitrust exemptions. Thus, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has
recently urged antitrust exemptions
... which would effectively and fully place American exporters and overseas
contractors on a fair and comparable competitive basis with foreign sellers and
contractors competing in world markets. Alternatively, the Congress should
adopt laws exempting American exporters and overseas contractors from U.S.
antitrust laws insofar as their activities are limited to operations designed to
increase the volume of American exports . . . ,4
The Chamber's report seems to assume a much broader application of
the U.S. antitrust laws to overseas operations than has in fact been the
case. As the Department of Justice put it in responding, "the United
States is quite lenient toward joint foreign business activity. '47 If the
Chamber wants American firms operating overseas to be able to enter
into broad international cartels (and this is not wholly clear from the
report), then such a policy is bound to have a serious impact on our
domestic consumer interests. This is true even if such a cartel could be
shown *as "designed to increase the volume of American exports."
Similarly, coercive conduct designed to drive an American competitor
out of an export market (as in Pacific Seafarers) hardly seems to further
our exporting interest.
Such critics as former Secretary Connally and the Chamber of
45. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 609, A-4 (April 17, 1973).
46. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Antitrust Task Force on International Trade and
Investment, Final Report on U.S. Antitrust and American Exports 3 (1974). The report says
that it is assuming the "continued application of each country's own antitrust laws to all
competitors, foreign and domestic, operating in any country's own domestic markets."
47. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Kauper to Arch N. Booth, reprinted in
BNA AnTRitusT & TRADE REG. Rn'. No. 663, F-1 (May 14, 1974).
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Commerce force us to ask the hard economic questions. Do we want
less competitive domestic markets on the theory that American con-
sumers should subsidize export opportunities? Do we want export
cartels even if they have a substantial anticompetitive spillover into the
domestic market? Do we really think that America will lead the world
in developing new products, services and delivery systems if our
large and vital national market is walled off from the rest of the
world? Unless we are willing to answer those questions in the
affirmative-which I am not-we must look to antitrust as an
affirmative tool of continuing importance. Maintaining our competi-
tiveness here is vital to our standard of living at home and to our place
in the world.
The critics on the other side say that the application of antitrust
argued for here does not go far enough. They would argue for a
broader application of our antitrust laws to situations overseas which
neither directly affect our home markets or our export opportunities.
A leading member of this group is Dean James A. Rahl of the
Northwestern University Law School. 48 He disagrees both on policy
and legal grounds. On the policy level, he disagrees with the view
outlined above that:
Foreign trade and foreign markets . .. should be viewed differently from
domestic problems-in our own self-interest, and because it is not the business
of Congress to concern itself with restraints inflicted .by Americans upon
foreigners abroad. ... 49
He suggests instead that:
[It] would not be so strange for Congress to be concerned with what our
businesses do to foreigners. If we are concerned with warfare and crime carried
on by Americans abroad, we might reasonably be concerned with the infliction
of economic damage abroad by conduct considered illegal at home.50
The answer to this, I believe, is that it misses the real world. Most
countries provide antitrust exemptions for export activities (as we do
ourselves with the Webb-Pomerene Act), and governments take all
kinds of frequently highly anticompetitive actions to promote their
nation's exports. Some also take anticompetitive measures to protect
their producers (which has the consequence of denying their consum-
ers the benefit of import competition!). We do the same in some areas.
48. See Address by James A. Rahl, "American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What
is Covered?", Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University Law School, Oct. 3,
1973, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. Id. at 9.
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This world is thoroughly documented in the Peterson study, and it
exists, like it or not. It seems to serve little analytic purpose to equate
the international business world of hard-nosed competition and protec-
tionism with bombing Cambodian villages. Moreover, nothing prevents
a foreign government, if it chooses, from applying its own antitrust
laws to the activities of foreign (including American) enterprises which
allocate markets or fix prices in that country. In other words, there is
no reason why the European Common Market should not treat an
American Webb-Pomerene association as an illegal price fixing conspi-
racy. Nor is there any reason why the United States should not treat a
European export cartel the same way under the Sherman Act. This
approach has great merit over what one might call vague inter-
nationalism: it throws the burden of enforcing antitrust law, and
protecting consumers, on the governments of the affected consumers.
Government rarely works effectively unless it has an affirmative in-
terest, and enforcement in this area is no exception.
Dean Rahl's second criticism might be labelled "legal." In Rahl's
words:
Personally, I would stick to what I consider to be the only reliable guide to the
scope of the Act-that is, that the Act is concerned with restraints of competition
which occur in, or which substantially affect any of the commerce, interstate or
foreign, which Congress regulates. This is what I think the Supreme Court
decided in the Timken case, and it is what antitrust policy is all about. From there
on out, it is a question of the particular substantive rules of effect on competi-
tion to be applied to determine the ultimate legality of the conduct.5'
The simple answer to this point is that it is not what was decided in the
Timken case-nor in any other case that I can find. At the very least, it
implies a great deal less flexibility in the Sherman Act than is reason-
ably present in it.
In Timken, the Supreme Court was dealing with an American firm
which was overwhelmingly dominant in its field. The company control-
led 70-80 percent of the American output of tapered roller bearings,
and its 1947 sales were over $77 million. These bearings c6mpeted for
many uses with other antifriction bearings and, in the broader total
market, the defendants still accounted for some 25 percent of all
United States sales. 52 The defendant was charged with a long-term
international allocation of markets with a British and a French firm.
Under these agreements, each of the parties had allocated trade
territories, fixed prices on sales into each other's territories, cooperated
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. 341 U.S. at 603-04 (Reed, J., concurring).
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to protect each other's markets and to eliminate outside competition,
and participated in specific cartel arrangements to restrict imports to
and exports from the United States.53 The defendant American firm
held 30 percent of the outstanding stock of the British company and 50
percent of the outstanding stock of the French company.
On these facts, the defendant made the unsuccessful argument that
the three firms were a single 'Joint venture" or enterprise, and hence
exempt from the antitrust laws. What the Court was left with, having
dealt with the affiliation question, was a broad world-wide cartel of
leading firms engaged in selling an important product amid elaborate
arrangements to ensure noncompetition. The defendants did argue
that ". . . the Sherman Act should not be enforced in this case because
what appellant has done is reasonable in view of current foreign trade
conditions." 54 The Court responded,
The argument in this regard seems to be that tariffs, quota restrictions and the
like are now such that the export and import of antifriction bearings can no
longer be expected as a practical matter; that appellant cannot successfully sell
its American-made goods abroad; and that the only way it can profit from
business in England, France and other countries is through the ownership of
stock in companies organized and manufacturing there. This position ignores
the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of foreign
trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and
import trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those provisions of
the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's argument that American busi-
ness must be left free to participate in international cartels, that free foreign
commerce in goods must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American
dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell abroad. Acceptance of
appellant's view would make the Sherman Act a dead letter insofar as it
prohibits contracts and conspiracies -in restraint of foreign trade. If such a
drastic change is to be made in the statute, Congress is the one to do it. 5
What the Supreme Court did here was to reject a very broad
argument in favor of cartels-a point on which it was clearly correct.
What the Court did not do was to say that all domestic antitrust rules
are going to be applied in precisely the same way in the international
field. As the Court stressed, the Sherman Act does reflect the policy
that export and import trade in commodities is both possible and
desirable. The reality is that the defendant over-argued its case. If in
fact it was impossible for it to sell its bearings in foreign markets
without manufacturing there, then the elaborate territorial allocation
scheme was not necessary. Even if it could not sell its bearings in
53. Id. at 595-96.
54. Id. at 599.
55. Id.
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certain foreign markets, this was not a justification for a private
arrangement that prevented others from selling their bearings in the
American market. The Timken decision never explicitly stated that the
cartel scheme at issue was per se illegal, let alone that all domestic per
se rules would be applied in a foreign context. In fact, as I have
argued, such a naked territorial allocation scheme designed to isolate
the United States from outside competition should be treated as per se
illegal under the Topco standard. The impact on the domestic American
market is fundamental and immediate, especially where a leading
competitor is involved.
Nor is the issue one of jurisdiction. In an early antitrust case,
American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 56 the Supreme Court held fairly
broadly that acts done abroad were subject only to the laws of the place
where they were committed, even if they injured foreign commerce.
Subsequent antitrust cases have retreated from this broad statement of
territoriality.5" The full sweep of the reversal is seen, for example, in
Judge Hand's celebrated Alcoa decision in 1945. He stated that "it is
settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends .... -58 This
very broad language had caused some perhaps appropriate concern.
Suffice it to say, however, that it is no longer the place of the act that is
key. When the act or agreement can be shown to have a direct effect on
markets within the United States, our law should reach it-and this is
especially so where the act was clearly intended to affect our market.
Of course, under our traditional jurisprudence, it is necessary to have
personal jurisdiction over the party committing the act.59 This normally
presents no problem with respect to the subsidiary of an American
corporation, let alone the corporation itself. It may, of course, pose a
problem where the potential defendants are foreign corporations
which do no business in the United States.
Thus, in the end, we are not dealing with a legal issue ofjurisdiction,
but of substance. The ultimate question is whether American antitrust
laws, particularly the Sherman Act, are sufficiently broad to allow the
application of more flexible rules to foreign transactions. The answer, I
submit, is "yes." Kingman Brewster makes this case very clearly and
56. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
57-. See K. BPRuWsTER, ANTRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 65 (1958).
58. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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analytically in his treatise. 60 He indicates that a naked economic re-
straint isolating the United States should not be treated any differently
than a naked territorial restraint within the country. The principal area
in which a different rule applies is where a restraint which is imposed
on export sales neither has nor is intended to have direct impact on the
American market. For example, an agreement between an American
firm and a British firm that the American firm will sell only in South
Africa and the British firm will sell only in Australia may restrain
American exports to the latter and hence, is arguably within the
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act; beyond that, competition within
Australia or within South Africa is a matter for their respective gov-
ernments rather than our own. On the other hand, an agreement
between the British firm and the American firm that the British firm
will not sell in the United States and the American firm will not sell
abroad raises an immediate and direct United States interest, which we
should protect by strict antitrust enforcement.
VI
THE AWKWARD PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENTS
National governments are especially important in the international
business realm. They are conspicuously active in organizing producer
cartels for primary products; they sometimes impose anticompetitive
restrictions on foreign firms and products; and in communist coun-
tries, they operate state trading monopolies for internal distribution of
goods and services.
Government activity can create special antitrust problems. For exam-
ple, long-term exclusive arrangements between an American firm and a
state trading monopoly may necessarily exclude all other American
firms from that market. The antitrust answer to these problems turns
on the factual realities of the situation. Where the foreign government,
as sovereign, requires an American firm to engage in some activity which
would otherwise be offensive to our antitrust laws, that is the end of the
antitrust inquiry. The same is not true where the American firm has
been the moving force in getting the anticompetitive contractual restric-
tions adopted-or has discretion in how they are administered.
The law in this area can be traced to the Supreme Court's 1943
60. K. BR~wsTm, supra note 57, at 79-96.
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decision in Parker v. Brown.61 There, the Supreme Court held that a
California state scheme for regulating raisin marketing was on its facts
exempt from the antitrust laws.
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorata program made no contract or
agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade . . , but as
sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act
did not undertake to prohibit.
62
This policy is broadly applicable in the international field.
The other side of the coin is illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1962
decision in Continental Ore v. Union Carbide.63 A defendant subsidiary of
an American company had been appointed during the war to act for
the Canadian Metals Controller as the sole buyer for Canada of a
particular metal, and it had used its position to favor its own interests
and to squeeze the plaintiff (another American firm) out of the Cana-
dian market. The Supreme Court held that this was actionable as part
of an alleged attempt to monopolize U.S. foreign commerce. The
Court noted that the defendant's control "... was aided by discrimina-
tory legislation of the foreign country . . ." but that the action was
"taken within the area of its discretionary powers granted by the Metals
Comptroller .... 64
To summarize, that which is required by a foreign government is
exempt from antitrust liability; but that which the foreign government
simply affords one the opportunity to do, may or may not be illegal,
depending upon its effect on American commerce.
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR REASON AND FLEXIBILITY
The world of international trade is competitive and complex. It is
also changing. Such circumstances offer a constant temptation to un-
wise policies-including antitrust repeals and protectionist. devices. We
should resist that temptation, because those policies are expensive to us
as a nation of consumers, and because they fail to come to grips with
the hard issues of skill and efficiency.
We must face up to the complexities of the real world. In fact, the
antitrust laws are conducive to such pragmatism.
The draftsmen of the Sherman Act created a statute of great breadth
and flexibility (the same is true of the amended Clayton Act § 7). The
61. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
62. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
63. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
64. Id. at 706 (emphasis added).
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Sherman Act has worked well because generations of prosecutors and
judges have given it specificity in dealing with particular types of
conduct in the ever-changing world of business. Some kinds of conduct
have been found to be so generally harmful as to be deemed per se
illegal, without actual proof of anticompetitive impact or other public
harm. Other kinds of conduct have been subjected to full factual
inquiry in both section 1 and section 2 cases.
Of course, the line has been close in certain cases-particularly joint
business ventures-as to whether particular conduct should be sub-
jected to a per se rule or not. Crucial in this determination are the
particular circumstances of the case and the attitude of the courts. 5 To
this extent, there is uncertainty in the law-and there always will
be-for, by definition, close cases are uncertain in their effect as
precedent. One alternative is to have inflexible rules, to be applied
without regard to real facts or consequences (as we have in parts of the
Internal Revenue Code and iti various forms of absolute tort liability).
The other alternative is to have no law at all. The proponents of
absolute antitrust exemption for all export activity are clearly asking
for the latter. Such a solution does eliminate legal uncertainty, but at an
unacceptable price to our consumer and business interests.
In fact, antitrust has been used relatively infrequently against foreign
business operations, and most of the actual use has been in "easy" cases
involving straight old-fashioned cartels. The Supreme Court has not
locked us into inflexible rules in the broad international business area,
and it has given no indication that it would do so.
In these circumstances, what is needed is rational argument, not
irrational recrimination; facts not footnotes; and a sense of our na-
tional public interest as competitive buyers and sellers and international
traders. With these, we can in fact protect our consumers at home and
allow our producers the fullest capability to compete abroad. That
which would be a clearly illegal restraint of trade in the domestic
market, can be a rational attempt by a group of American firms to
improve their export trade position in the face of stiff foreign competi-
tion abroad; it may even promote competition in the foreign market.
At the other extreme, the group agreement may purport to improve
export competitiveness, yet in reality produce clear adverse effects on
65. E.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Worthen Bank &
Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
918 (1974).
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competition among American firms at home and thus, ultimately, on
American consumers. Between the two extremes necessarily lies a "grey
area" subject to a "rule of reason"-even in situations which would call
for strict application of per se rules in a domestic setting.
In the final analysis, antitrust law is basic consumer protection
legislation. We should not weaken our law as a protection for our
consumers, even in the name of a fashionable issue like "export
promotion." Rather, we should apply the law firmly and rationally to all
who limit competition within our markets. By the same token, we
should expect that other nations and communities will use their anti-
trust laws to protect their consumers against those who restrain com-
petition in their markets.
